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Microsoft Windows Operating Systems 
Julian Breyer 
 
As encrypted information is very difficult or impossible to reconstruct, there are many 
situations in which it is critical to detect the presence of encryption software before a computer is 
shut down. Currently there is no solution that reliably identifies installed encryption software.  
 
For this investigation, thirty encryption software products for Microsoft Windows based 
on the NT-kernel have been identified and investigated. Operating system dependent factors such 
as registry, file attributes, operating system attributes, process list analysis and independent 
factors such as file headers, keyword search, Master Boot Record analysis as well as hashing of 
software components were investigated and allow the identification of these programs. The most 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The most common computer forensics analysis technique is known as “post-mortem 
analysis” or “dead analysis”. Responders disconnect any computer they suspect may contain 
evidence from its power source to prevent any accidental or malicious disposal or alteration of 
evidence and subsequently remove the disk drive from the computer [1]. The disk is then 
examined on a “trusted” computer using one of the many available computer forensic tools, such 
as EnCase, FTK or Autopsy [2]. The intent behind this “dead analysis” process is to examine the 
contents of the suspect’s hard disk using a write blocker and another computer. This eliminates 
the risk that the “trusted” computer used for forensic analysis will write anything to the disk 
under examination [3]. 
While this method has proven value for digital forensics, it also has a caveat: if the 
contents of a hard drive, or a portion thereof, were encrypted prior to the original computer’s 
shutdown, the contents of that hard drive may be irretrievably lost [4]. 
Live forensic analysis, on the other hand, is performed directly on the suspect’s 
computer. The computer is not shut down and volatile evidence, such as memory content, that is 
lost during shutdown is preserved. While this method allows investigators to examine the 
computer in the exact state in which it was seized, it also bears the risk that volatile and stored 
evidence might be changed or destroyed. This can be the result of faulty software used for the 
investigation or of a deliberate attempt to hide or destroy evidence. 
Currently there is no comprehensive solution available that reliably detects a variety of 
encryption software products and can be adapted to discover new or changed software products. 
This investigation identifies and examines a number of operating system dependent and 
independent factors by which known Windows encryption packages can be detected and 
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identified and which can be employed in a signature-based approach. A framework termed 
ALERT (Automated Live Encryption Recognition Tool) has been developed as a proof of 
concept that encryption software can be reliably detected with minimal human intervention 
during a live forensic investigation. To examine the reliability and effectiveness of each factor by 






This investigation examines if all of the thirty most common software encryption solutions 
identified for NT-based versions of Microsoft Windows are reliably identifiable through the live 
analysis of a combination of operating system dependent and independent factors. It furthermore 
analyzes whether one or more combinations of factors exists that is more reliable in terms of 
precision, recall and accuracy than any single factors in isolation. 
1.1 Predictions 
1.1.1 Best Performance When a Signature Exists 
It is expected that the Operating System dependent factors will produce the best results in terms 
of precision for cases in which a signature is available for the particular version to be detected. File 
Header analysis is expected to perform as well or better than any other factor in terms of recall but at the 
expense of execution speed. 
1.1.2 Best Performance When no Signature Exists 
Overall, it is expected that the keyword search will perform as well or better than any other factor 
in terms of recall when no signature exists for the software product. For Full Disk Encryption programs, 
the heuristic approach is expected to yield the best results in terms of recall while the Operating System 
dependent measures should yield very low recall but high precision values. 
1.1.3 Best Overall Performance 
It is expected that there exists a combination of factors C such that for any factor F in isolation 
recallC >= recallF because encryption software, like viruses, attempt to hide their presence by using 




Chapter 2 - Background 
2.1 Encryption 
2.1.1 Historical Background  
The protection of sensitive information has been important to societies since the inception 
of written communication. One of the first documented ciphers is the Caesar Cipher used by 
Julius Caesar to protect his correspondence from the prying eyes of his enemies. In this simple 
encryption system, letters of the alphabet are shifted, or transposed, by a certain number of steps. 
The sender and receiver might, for example, agree that all letters are transposed by three. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, a “B” would become an “E”, a “C” would become and “F” and so forth. 
The word “FILE” would become “ILOG”. What has not changed is the length of the “encrypted” 
word. Additionally, if one had access to a large enough sample of the encrypted text and knew 
which language it was written in and with which frequency certain letters occur in that language, 
it would be a trivial task to decipher the message. 
  While this might seem insecure today, the fact that few people could read even 
unencrypted communications at the time this cipher was conceived provided a certain amount of 
security. Today, this type of cipher is generally known as a “shift cipher” or “mono-alphabetic 
substitution” [5]. 
 
Figure 1 - Shift Cipher (Source: Wikipedia) 
As time progressed, new and more secure ciphers, as well as ways to break them, were 
devised. It was not until World War II, however, that computers were first used to attack cipher 
text. The Nazis had devised an encryption machine (the Enigma machine) to safeguard their 
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correspondence. Unlike the early shift ciphers, the Enigma relied on a more intricate form of 
cryptography known as “Poly-alphabetic Substitution” that had been developed in the 15th 
century. Poly-alphabetic substitution ciphers rely, as the name suggests, on multiple different 
alphabets and a key. The substitution is based on the alphabet belonging to a particular part of 
the key, the numerical value assigned to a letter (e.g. 1 for an “a”) and the corresponding 
substitution [5].  
 
Figure 2 - Vigenère Table used for poly-alphabetic substitution. (Source: Wikipedia) 
Since messages were commonly transmitted via wire or radio, the Allied Forces were 
able to intercept great amounts of cipher text. Dr. Alan Turing, a well-known English 
mathematician then working at a military facility in Bletchley Park, England, devised a method 
to use mechanical computers to decrypt the intercepted messages as part of a project named 
“Ultra”. While this was laborious and often did not lead to the successful decryption of a 
message, it built the foundation of much of today’s cryptanalysis [6]. 
In the light of the Cold War, the necessity to secure national secrets against opposing 
forces eventually led to the development of a National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) endorsed encryption standard now known as Data Encryption Standard (DES) [7].  While 
the standard was regarded as secure at the time, it used a secret key that had to be shared with 
others authorized to access data encrypted in this manner. Additionally, as shown by Diffie and 
5 
 
Hellman, its key length of 56 bits was too short to keep information secure for long when the 
computers used to attack the data were becoming more powerful every year [5]. 
The widespread access to computer networks and networks of networks, such as the 
internet, eventually led to a call for a new and improved standard. This occurred with the 
replacement of DES by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001 [8]. At the same time 
other mechanisms for communications, such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) encryption were designed. New encryption algorithms using massively long 
encryption keys that are based on the complexity of factoring relatively prime numbers as well as 
the advent of asymmetric encryption have made today’s encryption easy to use, virtually 
transparent and ubiquitous.  
Most of today’s operating systems are equipped with powerful encryption software that 
can be used to encrypt single files or an entire file system and require virtually no technical 
knowledge. Additionally, several third party solutions are available to both private individuals 
and the industrial world [5]. In addition to software-based encryption, many manufacturers of 
storage and computing equipment offer hardware implementations of current encryption 
algorithms that are faster and more difficult to circumvent than their software equivalents.  
2.1.2 Encryption Algorithms Commonly Used in Storage Encryption 
2.1.2.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was first published in 1998 as “Rijndael” by 
Rijmen and Daemen and later standardized in 2001 as a replacement for the aging Data 
Encryption Standard (DES). The algorithm employs a Substitution-Permutation network with a 
block size of 128 bit and a key length of 128, 192 or 256 bit. It further uses a symmetric key; i.e. 
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the same key is used for encryption and decryption. AES is currently approved by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) for information classified as Top Secret [9]. 
A Substitution-Permutation network applies a number of logic or algebraic operations to 
transform the input data. These operations are then repeated a number of times. The number of 
cycles depends on the length of the key. In AES, 10 cycles are used for 128 bit keys, 12 cycles 
for 192 bit keys and 14 cycles for 256 bit keys. Each cycle follows the following format: 
1. Key Expansion; round keys are derived using Rijndael’s key schedule. 
2. Initial Round 
- AddRoundKey: Bitwise operation that performs [𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘] ⊕ [𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖] . 
3. Rounds 
1. SubBytes: Each byte of input is replaced with another one according to a lookup 
table. 
2. ShiftRows: Each row of the block is shifted cyclically. 
3. MixColumns: Exchanges the order of the columns of the block cyclically. 
4. AddRoundKey 





The Serpent algorithm, proposed in 1998 by Anderson, Biham and Knudsen, is a 32-
round Substitution-Permutation network that utilizes a 128 bit block size and a key length of 128, 
192 and 256 bit. Like Rijndael, Serpent was a finalist for the AES standard. All steps of the 
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algorithm can be performed in parallel, which improves its performance but also renders it more 
susceptible to cryptanalysis [10]. 
The algorithm consists of 
1. An initial permutation 
2. 32 rounds of 
- key mixing 
- a pass through S-Boxes (substitution boxes) 
- a linear transformation in all but the last round 
3. A final permutation 
2.1.2.3 Twofish 
Twofish was proposed by Schneier, Wagner, Hall, Kelsey, Whiting and Ferguson in 1998 
– also in competition for the AES standard. Just as Rijndael and Serpent, it uses a block length of 
128 bits and a key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits but unlike the other two, it is implemented as a 
Feistel Network [11].  
The algorithm consists of 
1. An initial input whitening 
2. 16 rounds of 
- 4 S-Boxes 
- maximum distance separable (MDS) mapping 
- Pseudo-Hadamard transforms (PHT) 
- a bitwise shift 
- multiple XOR-operations 
3. Undo of the last swap operation 
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4. Output whitening 
2.1.3 Complexity of Breaking Current Encryption Standards 
The difficulty of breaking modern day encryption is best illustrated with a case 
investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Brazilian National Institute of 
Criminology in 2009. While investigating a Brazilian banker charged with money laundering, the 
authorities seized five hard drives that all exhibited military-grade AES 256-Bit encryption 
through a common Full Disk Encryption tool called TrueCrypt [12]. Since in Brazil as well as 
the United States, a suspect cannot be compelled to surrender an encryption key or password, the 
FBI attempted to decrypt the contents of the hard drive using various brute-force methods such 
as dictionary attacks. Twelve months later, the agents gave up having made no progress and 
returned the hard drive to the Brazilian authorities [13].  
All of the algorithms described in this section were deemed sufficiently secure by NIST 
to be accepted as finalists for the AES standard. While Rijndael ultimately won the contest, all 
three algorithms are thought to be very resilient against short-cut attacks, leaving brute force 
attacks (such as dictionary attacks) as the only viable option to decrypt the hard drive. 
Most hard- and software implementations today recommend a key length of 256 bits for 
confidential information. Breaking a key of this length by brute force would require 
approximately 2255 operations. Given 50 of the most powerful super-computer available in 2012 
(the 20-peta-FLOP Cray Titan at Oak Ridge National Labs) these machines could process a 
combined 1018 operations per second. At that rate, all 50 super-computers would require 
1.86*1051 years to attempt every possible combination. For AES, it has been shown that the 
complexity for a 256-bit key can theoretically be reduced to 2176 operations, reducing the time to 
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3*1027 years which is still far beyond feasible. The longest key successfully broken by this 
method had a length of 60 bits. 
2.1.4 Detecting and Identifying Encryption 
A method commonly employed in cryptanalysis is the analysis of the frequency with 
which symbols and characters occur in cipher text. If a simple cipher is employed, the frequency 
with which certain letters occur might provide useful information regarding the language of the 
clear text as well as a possible starting point for the decryption of the message. To avoid this, 
strong encryption methods strive for a roughly uniform distribution of all symbols so that no 
conclusion about the encryption system, the plain text message or even just the presence of 
encryption can be drawn. This makes the detection and identification of a particular encryption 
algorithm very difficult if not impossible. 
2.1.5 Prior Attempts to Detect Encrypted Data Storage 
Due to the inherent difficulty of detecting and classifying the presence of encryption 
itself, a number of companies have developed software tools to detect a small subset of 
commonly used encryption programs through alternate means, such as a search for a particular 
dynamically linked library (DLL) known to be used by the programs. JADsoftware’s “Encrypted 
Disk Detector” (EDD) [14] is capable of detecting TrueCrypt, PGP and BitLocker through 
analysis of the Master Boot Record (MBR). TechPathWay’s “ProDiscover” [4] does not detect 
any particular encryption suite but presents a user with the contents of the Master Boot Record 
(MBR). LEAP, a live encryption analysis program developed by another Master’s candidate at 
West Virginia University, can detect a number of encryption programs, including Microsoft 
BitLocker, but relies mainly on the analysis of file names in particular locations on the hard 
drive. Furthermore, there are several websites that claim to offer software that can classify the 
10 
 
algorithm used to encrypt a hard drive from patterns formed by the use of different algorithms 
but within the forensics community, these are widely regarded as a fraud. Other solutions may 
exist but were unavailable for analysis as they are often proprietary and classified and no 
information about their existence or functionality is made available to the general public. 
2.2 Electronic Evidence and the Forensic Process 
2.2.1 The Latency of Electronic Evidence 
Digital computers are state machines. This means that at any given moment, a computer 
has a well-defined state that constantly changes based on the previous state, inputs and outputs 
and operations that need to be performed on those data. This state can contain valuable 
information about the prior and present use of the computer but it is also constantly under threat 
of change and therefore must be preserved to the greatest extent possible given the time available 
to an investigator to prevent information from being destroyed. In less abstract terms, 
information about programs and data currently executing on the computer as well as time stamps 
and administrative data can change at any given moment and may make the recovery of previous 
information difficult or impossible. 
Some of the computer’s data resides on long-term / semi-permanent storage usually 
referred to as “hard-drives”, while other information is stored in the computer’s volatile registers 
or its Random Access Memory (RAM). This type of memory relies on the presence of an electric 
current to preserve the information stored within it. Once this current is lost (e.g. due to a loss of 
power or controlled shutdown), the information quickly dissipates and becomes irretrievable. 
Additionally, magnetic storage can easily be altered or destroyed if the storage medium is 
handled improperly. A drop and even moderate impact can damage the fragile magnetic platter 
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on which information is stored. Electromagnetic fields can also alter the data stored on the 
magnetic disk [15]. 
This inherent volatility of electronic evidence, just as the volatility of fingerprints or other 
trace evidence requires that the evidence be collected, handled, examined and preserved with the 
utmost care and in a way that holds up in a court of law. This requires training and reliable and 
well-tested tools and processes. 
 
2.2.2 The Classical 4-phase Approach 
To accommodate the stringent requirements for the permissibility of electronic evidence 
at trial, digital forensics typically employs a four-phase approach. It consists of collection, 
examination, analysis and reporting phases.  
2.2.2.1 The Collection Phase 
Typically, the collection phase takes place at the site of the incident. Investigators first 
document the site. This may include accounts of what technology was found at the scene and 
what the devices looked like or displayed when they were found. This account is usually 
augmented by photographs and possibly screens shots. Once the original state of the site has 
been documented, the incident responder will either conduct a live analysis of the device or 
disconnect it from its power source. The live analysis will be discussed in a later section of this 
chapter. Once the computer has been separated from its power supply, all incoming and outgoing 
connections to peripherals are labeled and documented [16]. It has become increasingly difficult 
to identify and recognize all relevant devices since many of them look inconspicuous or require 
training to be recognized. The computerization and networking of seemingly benign items (cars, 
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phones, copy machines, coffee makers etc.) that may contain important evidence further 
complicates this task.  
2.2.2.2 The Examination Phase 
The examination phase concentrates on the extraction of evidence from the seized 
devices. This includes the detection and identification of the evidence as well as the explanation 
of its origin and significance [15]. The work in this phase is commonly conducted by forensic 
examiners with the help of well-tested software suites such as Guidance Software’s “EnCase” 
[2]. Since in a computer most evidence such as artifacts of a user’s visited websites or a timeline 
of tasks conducted on the computer in a 24 hour window cannot be seen with the bare eye, it 
must be made visible by the forensic examiner so that its significance can later be determined by 
a criminal investigator.  
The volatile nature of the evidence again becomes important. If a tool or method used by 
the examiner were to alter, erase or add information to the secured evidence, the evidence would 
be useless in court. Therefore, all tools, physical or software, must be subjected to thorough 
testing to demonstrate that they do not alter the evidence in any way. Likewise, the examiner 
must have a thorough understanding of the function of a computer and how the evidence might 
have been produced as it would otherwise be easy for an investigator to interpret the results of 
the examination incorrectly and mistake benign data for incriminating evidence or vice-versa. 
Examination is commonly conducted in one of two different ways: as “live” analysis on a 
running system or as “dead” or “post-mortem” analysis of the secured storage device via a 
second, trusted set of hardware and software. “Post-mortem” analysis should generally be 
regarded as favorable as the use of a separate trusted system offers more safeguards against the 
inadvertent alteration of evidence. Furthermore, the fact that the computer under investigation is 
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shut down guarantees that no program on it can be executed that would hide, alter or dispose of 
incriminating evidence.  
As Brian Carrier notes  [1], there is virtually nothing that “live” analysis can accomplish 
that cannot also be accomplished via “post-mortem” analysis. This, however, is only true with 
certain qualifications. If the computer system is an essential production system, the cost of 
removing and replacing it might be prohibitive. Furthermore, if the contents of the computer 
system’s hard drive are encrypted, “post-mortem” analysis of its stored contents is only possible 
if the encryption key or password can be obtained. Without this, the information stored on the 
computer becomes inaccessible as soon as the computer is shutdown or its operating system is 
locked due to inactivity. 
2.2.2.3 The Analysis Phase 
The analysis phase is conducted by the criminal investigator and interprets the findings of 
the examination phase. While the examiner and investigator may be the same person, the two 
phases serve essentially different purposes. The examination phase concentrates on the technical 
abstraction of evidence from the seized computer(s) while the analysis phase attempts to relate 
the evidence secured from the computer to the crime under investigation. 
2.2.2.4 The Reporting Phase 
The reporting phase creates a seamless report of all of the actions performed during the 
previous three phases. During discovery or at trial, forensic examiners should not only present 
the results of their examination but must also convince all parties involved that their method was 
sound and that they were qualified to conduct the analysis. 
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2.2.3 Order of Volatility 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has published in RFC 3227 the order in 
which evidence decays and therefore should be secured [17]: 
-  registers, cache 
-  routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics, memory 
-  temporary file systems 
-  disk 
-  remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in question 
-  physical configuration, network topology 
-  archival media 
2.3 Files and File Systems 
2.3.1 Files 
A file is, in its simplest form, a logical collection of characters of which a physical 
representation is stored in volatile or non-volatile memory. In ASCII, one of the most common 
character sets in use today, each character is represented by seven bits for a total of 128 different 
representable characters. On magnetic devices, each bit comprising a character is simply 
described as being represented by the polarity of a particular storage cell on the magnetic platter. 
In volatile and solid state memory, it is often represented as the presence or absence of a charge 
in a storage cell.  
 
2.3.2 File Systems 
Files are not usually stored in coherent units on the storage device but are often spread 
out across a storage device for efficiency reasons.  
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In order to manage the physical space available and to locate and retrieve the various 
pieces of a file, Operating Systems commonly employ file systems as another abstraction. A file 
system is a collection of files and a set of functions to store, modify, delete, identify and locate 
any particular file. Commonly, file systems also contain means to protect files and to manage 
and compact storage units and thus increase the efficiency, usability and security of the storage 
device [3]. 
2.3.3 File Attributes and Metadata 
Files are often augmented by meta-information; i.e. information about the file. The most 
common metadata are the filename and the modified, accessed and created time stamps 
associated with each file. These are usually set by the file system but may be altered manually. 
Other file attributes can express that a file is write-protected, hidden, encrypted or compressed. 
While all of these attributes or metadata are easy to falsify or alter, they can contain vital 
information about the file [3].  
 
2.4 Measures of Reliability 
2.4.1 Confusion Matrix 
A confusion matrix or confusion table is an illustration of the performance of an 
algorithm typically employed in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Each column 
represents an expectation while each row represents actual results. These results can be grouped 
into four categories: true positives, false positives, true negatives and false negatives. Presented 
with an algorithm that is supposed to classify cats in a group of cats or dogs, true positives would 
be the instances in which a cat was correctly classified as a cat, true negatives would be cases in 
which a dog was not classified as a cat, false positives would be cases in which a dog was 
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classified as a cat and false negatives would be cases in which a cat was not classified as a cat. 
With regards to this investigation, true positives are considered cases in which encryption 
software was present and detected, false positives are cases in which encryption software was not 
present but is detected, true negatives are cases in which no encryption software was present and 
none was recognized and false negatives are cases in which encryption software was present but 
not detected. 
                      Predicted 
Actual 
Encryption Software No Encryption Software 
Encryption Software True Positive False Negative  
No Encryption Software False Positive True Negative 
Table 1 - Confusion Table for Encryption Detection 
2.4.2 Precision 
Precision is the ratio of the number of true positives to the sum of the numbers of true and 
false positives. For the work at hand, precision plays a minor role as it is more important to 
identify all true positives and minimize the false negatives than it is to identify only the true 
positives and minimize the false positives. 




Equation 1 – Precision 
A here denotes the number of True Positives and B the number of False Positives. 
2.4.3 Recall 
Recall measures the ratio of the number of true positives to the sum of the numbers of 
true positives and false negatives. This value is important for this investigation because it 
indicates the predictive value of each factor under investigation. The recall will be the primary 
quality measure for each factor. 
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Equation 2 – Recall 
A here denotes the number of True Positives and C the number of False Negatives. 
2.4.4 Accuracy 
Accuracy expresses the ratio of the sum of the numbers of true positives and true 
negatives to the sum of the numbers of true negatives, true positives, false negatives and false 




𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷
 
Equation 3 – Accuracy 
A here denotes the number of True Positives, B the number of False Positives, C the 




2.5 Software Detection 
2.5.1 Signature Based Software Detection 
In the context of virus and malware detection and identification, signatures are 
abstractions of one or more factors by which a particular program can be identified. To obtain 
these signatures, a piece of software is analyzed for common behavior or artifacts that are 
consistently created by the software and can that be detected. This may encompass file header 
values, code signatures, checksums or other criteria that can be contained in a file, the operating 
system, a directory, the boot sector, or any other detectable location.  
This approach is very efficient in that multiple criteria can be combined into an 
abstraction that indicates the presence of a particular piece of software. Its major drawback is 
that only known programs can be identified this way. Even minor changes to the software may 
require the derivation of a new or alternate signature to guarantee that the alternate version is still 
detected. 
2.5.2 Heuristic Software Detection 
 To mitigate the problems that may arise from outdated signature databases and yet 
unknown viruses, heuristic methods are often employed. A heuristic method does not detect any 
particular security threat but rather monitors the Operating System for suspicious behavior that is 
common for particular attacks. If, for example, a program requests to execute a certain sequence 
of suspicious commands or a kernel-level function that is normally reserved for the Operating 
System, the heuristic monitor can use this information to deduce the likelihood that the behavior 




2.5.3 The Balance between False Positives and False Negatives 
Most consumer and enterprise grade software is expected to reduce the number of false 
positives to reduce user confusion and frustration. If a user is permanently alerted to security 
threats that turn out to be false positives, he will be more inclined to ignore all warnings. Thus, 
for this type of software it is preferable to miss a small percentage of possible threats in order to 
reduce the number of false positives. 
For the detection of encryption software, the impact of false positives is assumed to be 
reversed: in order to minimize the risk of missing an encrypted volume even a considerable 
number of false positives is acceptable as long as the number of false negatives approaches zero. 
This is believed to be the case because the consequences of any false negative could be 
catastrophic and result in the loss of evidence. False positives, however, are negligible because 
computers are not routinely scanned for encryption software and thus the false positives do not 




Chapter 3 - Experiments 
3.1 Setup 
3.1.1 Identified Encryption Software Packages 
First, a list of common Full Disk Encryption (FDE) programs and container-based 
encryption software was compiled. This list encompasses a total of 30 programs and can be 
found in Table 2, section 3.1.2. 
3.1.2 Derivation of Signature Values 
In order to derive signatures for all of the thirty programs, a uniform approach was 
followed as shown below. 
 
Figure 3 - Signature Derivation Process 
 
Each of the thirty programs was installed in a clean Windows XP Virtual Machine (VM). 
Each program was then used to create an encrypted container (virtual drive) or file system. For 
Install
•Install program in a clean Microsoft Windows XP Virtual Machine.
Container
•Create an encrypted container
•Create a second encrypted container - if possible with a different password and algorithm.
•Analyze file extension and header of resulting container files.
•Analyze Windows Registry entry for program.
FDE
•Create encrypted File System.
•Create a second encrypted File System.
•Analyze MBR
•Analyze Windows Registry entry for program.
Other
•Many encryption programs have names or files that contain "crypt", "krupt", "krypt", "safe" "key" and "private".
•Search for file names and processes that contain these sub-strings.
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the full disk encryption programs, the Master Boot Record and Windows Registry were analyzed 
while for container based programs, the header and extension of the resulting encrypted 
container and Windows Registry were analyzed. Next, another container or File System was 
created (if possible, using a different encryption algorithm and password) and the 
aforementioned values were analyzed again for the new file container or File System. 
 If a factor remained constant between the two tests, it was recorded and the program was 
deemed identifiable by this particular factor. The two outliers are Microsoft’s Encrypting File 
System, which can be identified only through a file attribute, and Microsoft BitLocker, which 
can be identified solely via an Operating System attribute.  
Lastly, the entire File System and Process List were searched for file names and 
processes containing the sub-strings “crypt” although the list has since been expanded to also 






















AdvancedFileSecurity X  X  X X   
ArchicryptLive5  X X  X X   
BestCrypt   X  X X  X 
BestCrypt_FDE X X X   X  X 
BitLocker X X X X X   X 
CompuSec X X X X X X   
CryptArchiveLite  X X  X X   
CypherixLE  X X  X X   
drivecrypt X X X  X X   
E4M X X X X X X   
EFS X X  X X X   
FreeOTFE X  X X X X   
GilliSoftFDE X X X X X X   
LetEncrypt X X X  X X   
Loop-aes X  X X X X  X 
Keyparc X X X X X X   
Kruptos2Professional X  X  X X   
MyWinLocker  X X X X X   
n-CryptPro X X X  X X   
NCrypt X X X  X X   
PGPDisk   X X X X   
PGP WDE X X X X  X   
PrivateDisk X  X  X X   
PrivateSafeHD X X X  X X   
R-Crypto X  X  X X   
SafeBoot X X X   X  X 
SafeticaPersonal X  X  X X   
SafeHousePro X  X  X X   
Sentry2020  X X X X X  X 
TrueCrypt X X X   X   
 
Checkmarks () denote that the software can be identified by the corresponding factor while X denotes that this 
is not the case. 
 




3.1.3 Heuristic Detection 
In addition to the factors identified before, Full Disk encryption should be detectable 
through the sampling of multiple megabytes of data in various pseudo-random locations across 
the hard drive and a subsequent frequency analysis of clear-text strings in these samples. 
Unencrypted Operating Systems exhibit considerable numbers of plain text strings (e.g. in user 
files, linker libraries etc.) while an encrypted hard drive should exhibit drastically fewer strings. 




3.2 Test Framework 
 In order to test the five hypotheses, a sample implementation for Microsoft Windows was 
developed. The resulting framework, termed ALERT (Automated Live Encryption Recognition Tool), 
integrates all of the tests listed below (with the exception of file hashes) with a simple-to-use Graphical 
User Interface. It runs the various tests in sequence and logs the start time, results and stop time for each 
test. It uses a signature file that contains all factors by which a particular program can be identified (see 
Table 2). Additionally, the Modified/Accessed/Created (MAC) times are saved before and after the 
execution to allow conclusions about the changes to MAC times resulting from the Live analysis. The 
framework was developed for users with minimal technical knowledge. It only requires a small number of 
options to be set by the user. The drive to be examined must be chosen from a drop-down menu. In 
addition, the user has to choose one of two modes of operation. The concise quick-scan performs all tests 
except for the file-header analysis. The full-scan option is more thorough but potentially very time-
consuming.  
 Once the examination has been completed, the user is presented with four categories in which 
possible indicators of encryption software may fall as well as a tab that presents basic information about 
the computer and Operating System in use as well as some volatile information. This information is 
recorded to preserve as much information about the computer at the time of the analysis as possible as this 
information may become inaccessible if the computer is rebooted or used even if no encryption software 
is used. The user is presented with a color-coded dialog box that informs him whether the computer is 
exhibiting sure or probable signs of encryption software. All information is saved in a log file on a 
separate USB drive. This drive is also used to store the MAC times for all files on the examined drive. 
Together, these two files permit a forensic examiner to draw conclusions about the use of the computer 




 Figure 4 - ALERT Encryption Recognition Tool 
 
3.2.1 Windows Registry Analysis 
The Registry is a small, embedded database that has been part of every Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is used to store information about the current configuration of the 
Windows instance as well as the software installed in it. Virtually every program that is installed 
on a Windows computer stores key information relating to its configuration in the Registry. By 
examining the Registry for a key or value known to belong to a particular program one can very 
reliably deduce that the software was present at least at some point in the past. Programs are 
supposed to remove their keys during uninstallation. However, this is often not performed 
adequately and the presence of the key therefore does not necessarily indicate that the software is 
still present. 
No information is available about how the registry database is implemented. The 
algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(n) operations where n is the 
number of keys to be queried.  
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3.2.2 File Headers 
Many file formats use a short sequence of constant values at the beginning of the file to 
enable consistency checks between the file’s file extension and its content. This is, however, not 
a requirement and many non-standardized file formats do not utilize a constant header. In fact, 
many encryption programs deliberately avoid the use of a header to make it more difficult to 
identify a file as an encrypted container. When used consistently by a program, file headers are a 
good identifying factor but the fact that not many of the identified programs utilize them and that 
this is a very time-consuming check (every file on the drive must be opened for read-access and 
its first bytes compared to every signature in a file of known signatures) make it a non-optimal 
choice as a sole factor. The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k*m) 
operations where k is the number of signature values and m is the number of files in the file 
system to be queried. This can take an extremely long time for a large file system. 
3.2.3 File Extensions 
In most modern operating systems, file names consist of a variable length name followed 
by a period character and a usually three to four character long file extension. In many cases, this 
file extension identifies the file as one of a particular format (e.g. docx for Microsoft’s XML 
Word Document Format). Most of the identified encryption programs allow the user to choose 
any file extension for an encrypted container or none at all. Additionally, the file extension can 
usually be changed without consequences for the functionality of the program. This examination 
can be performed in a slightly faster fashion than the File Header analysis because most modern 
file systems treat file names as meta-information that is stored in a very efficient data structure 
that allows for fast access to this information without the necessity to traverse the relatively slow 
mechanical drive.  
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The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k*m) operations 
where k is the number of signature values and m is the number of files in the file system to be 
queried.  
3.2.4 File Attributes 
File attributes, much like the File Name, are considered meta-information – information 
about the file. Common file attributes in current Operating Systems are the “hidden”,”write-
protect” and “archive” flags. Microsoft Encrypting File System (EFS) utilizes this technique to 
flag files as “Encrypted”. EFS itself is simply a NTFS implementation that utilizes encryption for 
particular files or folders. In Microsoft Operating Systems, this test is very limited because no 
other program uses flag values to indicate encrypted files. However, this test is fairly fast 
(especially when combined with tests for other meta-information), reliable and it is entirely 
possible that other Operating or File Systems use this technique more extensively. 
The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(m) operations where 
m is the number of files in the file system to be queried. 
3.2.5 Master Boot Record 
The Master Boot Record (MBR) is the boot code in the first 512 bytes of a hard drive.It 
contains some assembly code as well as signature values. Many of the Full Disk Encryption 
programs that were analyzed for this experiment stored an ASCII text-string or signature value in 
the MBR. In theory, this value can be overwritten without consequences but this requires at least 
moderate technical knowledge and, more importantly, knowledge that this signature value exists 
in the Master Boot Record. Since the amount of data that must be retrieved for this test and the 
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number of comparisons to be made are relatively small, this test is a fast and reliable indicator 
for the presence of Full Disk Encryption. 
The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k) operations where 
k is the number of signature values.  
3.2.6 Operating System Attributes 
With Windows Vista, Microsoft introduced an encryption mechanism called BitLocker 
that utilizes the presence of a hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip to encrypt the hard 
drive. Since the TPM chip is a part of the motherboard and cannot easily be moved, the hard 
drive becomes inaccessible if it is moved outside of the computer with which it was encrypted. 
Windows provides a convenient way of querying not only the use of BitLocker but also what its 
current state is (encrypting, decrypting, encrypted or decrypted). As it is implemented and 
maintained by the Operating System, this factor is very fast and reliable but can only be used to 
identify BitLocker. 
The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k*m) operations 
where k is the number of signature values and m is the number of files in the file system to be 
queried.  
3.2.7 Keyword Search 
Many encryption files have the words “crypt”, “safe” or “private” (or variations thereof) 
in their name or use these in file names. By searching for files that contain these substrings in 
their file name, programs that are unidentified or cannot be identified by other means may be 
found. Using the same mechanism as for the File Extension and File Attribute analyses, the 
process is relatively fast (however, due to the large number of comparisons slightly less so than 
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the other two meta-factors). It does produce large numbers of false positives as many off-the-
shelf software products also contain files that fit the above pattern but it can help identify files 
and programs that may otherwise remain unnoticed. This is one of two checks employed by most 
of the other forensic software packages that claim to perform encryption detection. 
The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k*m) operations 
where k is the number of keywords and m is the number of files in the file system to be queried.  
3.2.8 Process List Keyword Search 
In Windows, Unix, Linux and MacOS, the process list contains the name and some other 
information about all non-kernel level programs that are currently running in the Operating 
System. Relying on the same keywords used in 3.3.7, many identified and unidentified 
encryption programs can be identified. Additionally, with the exception of BitLocker, there is 
usually no other way to identify whether or not the program is currently running. The benefits of 
this are assumed to outweigh the relatively modest number of false positives this method may 
yield. 
The algorithm used for this framework can be assumed to require Θ(k*p) operations 
where k is the number of keywords and p is the number of processes currently running.  
3.2.9 Cryptographic Hashing of Program Components 
For this factor, a cryptographic checksum is computed for every file that the software is 
comprised of. If an appropriate hashing algorithm (such as SHA-256) is used, the likelihood of 
two files producing the same checksum is approaching zero.  
While this method is extremely accurate, it suffers from two grave problems: every time 
a file is changed, the checksum changes which necessitates the computation of new reference 
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values. Secondly, the time to compute a cryptographic hash of every file in the File System as 
well as the time required for the comparison against the signature database could potentially take 
a very long time. For this reason, this factor was not included in ALERT. 
3.2.10 Heuristic Detection 
 As described before, the basic properties of encryption suggest that one should be able to 
detect the use of encryption by examining collections of a few megabytes each from various 
places across the hard drive and analyzing the number of plain text strings in the samples. 
Theoretically, an encrypted hard drive should exhibit few, if any, plain text strings while they 
should be relatively abundant on a non-encrypted drive.  
This method has the benefit that the software used to encrypt a full volume or hard drive 
does not even have to be present on the drive and the encryption could still be detected. 
Unfortunately, experiments conducted for this thesis showed that this is infeasible in practice as 
it clashes with another common property of current Full Disk Encryption: transparency. As long 
as the computer is in use, the presence of the encryption is completely transparent to both, the 
user and Operating System. The samples drawn from the test systems were virtually identical 
regardless of whether or not the volume was encrypted. 
If one was able to examine the drive through a hypervisor that runs underneath the 
encryption software (e.g. in a Virtual Machine) or during a dead analysis, the contents of the 
hard drive are expected to confirm the hypothesis that encrypted drives can be identified by the 
low number of plain text strings observed on the drive. Since this work is geared towards Live 
Analysis, however, no further attempts in this direction were made and the analysis tools were 




The detectability of encryption software was tested through three different sets of 
experiments. First, baseline experiments were conducted in which the test framework was run 
against a clean installation of Microsoft Windows XP, Windows 7 and Windows 8 as shown in 
table 3. 
Next, the test framework was used to examine 18 installations of Microsoft Windows 
each of which contained one or more encrypted containers or hard disks. Programs for which a 
signature was available to the test framework were used to create the encrypted containers and 
partitions. Table 4 shows the exact configuration for each of the 18 experiments. 
Last, tests were conducted approximately twelve months after the initial experiment. 
Each installation contained one of the previously identified programs but in the then-current 
version as listed in table 5.  
To ensure the accuracy of the results, two trials were conducted for each experiment. The 










Hardware Intel Core i5 3.30 GHz CPU, 8GB of RAM, 500GB Seagate HDD 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 
XP SP 3 
Microsoft Windows 7 
SP 1 
Microsoft Windows 8 
Encryption Software none none none 







































Hardware Intel Core i5 3.30 GHz CPU, 8GB of RAM, 500GB Seagate HDD 
Operating System Microsoft Windows XP SP 3 Microsof
t 
Windows 
7 SP 1 
Advanced File 
Security 
                 
ArchiCrypt Live 5                  
BestCrypt                  
Compusec                  
CryptArchiveLite                  
Cypherix LE                  
FreeOTFE                  
Keyparc                  
Kruptos 2 
Professional 
                 
LoopAES                  
MyWinLocker                  
PGP Disk                  
PrivateDisk                  
R-Crypto                  
Safetica Personal                  
Sentry2020                  
TrueCrypt                  (FDE) 
 
A checkmark () denotes that the software or an encrypted container created with it was present in the experiment.  





 Exp 18 Exp 19 Exp 20 Exp 21 Exp 22 Exp 23 Exp 24 Exp 25 
Hardware Intel Core i7 2.9GHz CPU, 500GB HDD, 8GB RAM 
 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 7 SP 1 
Advanced File Security         
ArchiCrypt Live 5         
BestCrypt         
Microsoft BitLocker         
PGP Disk         
PrivateDisk         
PrivateSafe HD         
R-Crypto         
TrueCrypt        (FDE)  
 
A checkmark () denotes that the software or an encrypted container created with it was present in the experiment. 
Table 5 - Experiments after 12 Months without Updated Signatures 
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Chapter 4 – Results 
The following ten tables list the results for each of the 25 experiments. The first seven 
tables show the results obtained when using a particular factor in isolation. The final three tables 
show the results obtained with three different combinations of factors.  
For each experiment, each table contains the number of True Positives, False Positives, 
True Negatives and False Negatives that were obtained as well as the Accuracy, Precision and 
Recall values that were calculated based on these results.  
If there had been any differences between the results obtained in each of the two trials for 
each experiment, these would be noted in the table as well. Finally, the mean Precision, Recall and 
Accuracy values for the experiment and the standard deviation for each of the three values can be 









Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 4 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 5 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 6 3 27 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 7 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 8 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 9 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 10 4 26 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 11 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 12 3 27 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 13 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 14 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 15 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 16 6 24 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 17 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 18 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 19 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 20 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.96 0 0 0 
Exp 21 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.96 0 0 0 
Exp 22 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 23 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 24 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.96 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.8800 0.3250 0.9952 0.0130 0.8800 0.3250 

























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 27 1 0 0.660 0 0.966 0 1 0 
Exp 4 0 27 1 2 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 5 0 27 1 2 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 6 2 26 1 1 0.660 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 7 1 27 1 1 0.500 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 8 1 27 1 0 0.500 0 0.960 0 1 0 
Exp 9 1 27 1 1 0.500 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 10 2 25 1 2 0.660 0 0.900 0 0.500 0 
Exp 11 0 27 1 2 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 12 0 26 1 3 0 0 0.860 0 0 0 
Exp 13 0 28 1 1 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 14 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 15 1 27 1 1 0.500 0 0.900 0 0.500 0 
Exp 16 1 25 1 5 0.500 0 0.800 0 0.160 0 
Exp 17 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 18 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 19 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 20 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 21 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 22 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 23 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 24 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.2992 0.3837 0.9374 0.0477 0.2992 0.4136 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 2 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 3 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 4 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 5 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 6 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 7 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 8 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 9 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 10 3 26 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.750 0 
Exp 11 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 12 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 13 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 14 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 15 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 16 1 24 0 5 1 0 0.800 0 0.160 0 
Exp 17 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 18 1 29 2 0 0.33 0 0.9375 0 1 0 
Exp 19 0 29 2 1 0 0 0.9063 0 0 0 
Exp 20 1 29 2 0 0.33 0 0.9375 0 1 0 
Exp 21 0 29 2 1 0 0 0.9063 0 0 0 
Exp 22 0 29 2 1 0 0 0.9063 0 0 0 
Exp 23 0 29 2 1 0 0 0.9063 0 0 0 
Exp 24 1 29 2 0 0.33 0 0.9375 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 2 1 0 0 0.9063 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.4796 0.4723 0.9366 0.0442 0.4364 0.4394 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 2 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 3 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 4 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 5 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 6 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 7 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 8 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 9 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 10 0 26 0 4 0 0 0.860 0 0 0 
Exp 11 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 12 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 13 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.960 0 0 0 
Exp 14 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.960 0 0 0 
Exp 15 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 16 0 24 0 6 0 0 0.800 0 0 0 
Exp 17 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 18 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 19 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 20 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 21 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 22 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 23 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 24 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Avg.  0 0 0.9356 0.0390 0 0 




Figure 8 - Precision, Accuracy and Recall for File Attributes 




















Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 2 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 3 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.930 0 0.500 0 
Exp 4 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 5 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 6 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 7 1 28 0 1 1 0 0.966 0 0.500 0 
Exp 8 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 9 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 10 0 26 0 4 0 0 0.860 0 0 0 
Exp 11 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 12 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 13 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 14 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 15 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 16 1 24 0 5 1 0 0.800 0 0.160 0 
Exp 17 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 18 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 19 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 20 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 21 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 22 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 23 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 24 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.2400 0.4271 0.9443 0.0438 0.1680 0.3367 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 2 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 3 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 4 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 5 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 6 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 7 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 8 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 9 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 10 0 26 0 4 0 0 0.860 0 0 0 
Exp 11 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 12 0 27 0 3 0 0 0.900 0 0 0 
Exp 13 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.960 0 0 0 
Exp 14 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.960 0 0 0 
Exp 15 0 28 0 2 0 0 0.930 0 0 0 
Exp 16 0 24 0 6 0 0 0.800 0 0 0 
Exp 17 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 18 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 19 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 20 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 21 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 22 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 23 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 24 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0.966 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.0400 0.1960 0.9373 0.0409 0.0400 0.1960 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 28 0  
Base 2 0 30 29 0 
Base 3 0 30 29 0 
Exp 1 1 29 38 0 0.026 0 0.441 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 21 0 0.047 0 0.588 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 28 22 0 0.091 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 4 2 28 22 0 0.091 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 5 1 28 26 1 0.037 0 0.509 0 0.500 0 
Exp 6 2 27 29 1 0.065 0 0.491 0 0.666 0 
Exp 7 1 28 22 1 0.046 0 0.558 0 0.500 0 
Exp 8 0 29 32 1 0 0 0.468 0 0 0 
Exp 9 1 28 29 1 0.033 0 0.491 0 0.500 0 
Exp 10 2 26 23 2 0.087 0 0.528 0 0.500 0 
Exp 11 0 28 23 2 0 0 0.528 0 0 0 
Exp 12 0 27 31 3 0 0 0.443 0 0 0 
Exp 13 0 29 32 1 0 0 0.468 0 0 0 
Exp 14 0 29 32 1 0 0 0.468 0 0 0 
Exp 15 0 28 31 2 0 0 0.459 0 0 0 
Exp 16 2 24 40 4 0.050 0 0.371 0 0.333 0 
Exp 17 1 29 28 0 0.034 0 0.517 0 1 0 
Exp 18 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.089 0 0 0 
Exp 19 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 20 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 21 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.089 0 0 0 
Exp 22 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 23 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.089 0 0 0 
Exp 24 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.089 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.0247 0.0311 0.3684 0.1949 0.4799 0.4380 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 28 0  
Base 2 0 30 29 0 
Base 3 0 30 29 0 
Exp 1 1 29 38 0 0.026 0 0.441 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 21 0 0.047 0 0.588 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 28 22 0 0.091 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 4 2 28 22 0 0.091 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 5 2 28 27 0 0.069 0 0.526 0 1 0 
Exp 6 2 27 30 1 0.063 0 0.483 0 0.666 0 
Exp 7 2 28 23 0 0.080 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 8 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 9 2 28 30 0 0.063 0 0.500 0 1 0 
Exp 10 3 26 24 1 0.111 0 0.537 0 0.750 0 
Exp 11 2 28 24 0 0.077 0 0.555 0 1 0 
Exp 12 3 27 32 0 0.086 0 0.484 0 1 0 
Exp 13 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 14 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 15 2 28 32 0 0.059 0 0.484 0 1 0 
Exp 16 4 24 42 2 0.087 0 0.388 0 0.666 0 
Exp 17 1 29 28 0 0.034 0 0.517 0 1 0 
Exp 18 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 19 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 20 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 21 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 22 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 23 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 24 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.090 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.0428 0.0354 0.3748 0.1980 0.9233 0.2134 
























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 28 0  
Base 2 0 30 29 0 
Base 3 0 30 29 0 
Exp 1 1 29 38 0 0.026 0 0.441 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 21 0 0.047 0 0.588 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 28 23 0 0.080 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 4 2 28 23 0 0.080 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 5 2 28 27 0 0.069 0 0.526 0 1 0 
Exp 6 3 27 30 0 0.091 0 0.500 0 1 0 
Exp 7 2 28 23 0 0.080 0 0.566 0 1 0 
Exp 8 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 9 2 28 30 0 0.063 0 0.500 0 1 0 
Exp 10 4 26 24 0 0.143 0 0.555 0 1 0 
Exp 11 2 28 24 0 0.077 0 0.555 0 1 0 
Exp 12 3 27 32 0 0.086 0 0.484 0 1 0 
Exp 13 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 14 1 29 33 0 0.029 0 0.476 0 1 0 
Exp 15 2 28 32 0 0.059 0 0.484 0 1 0 
Exp 16 5 24 42 1 0.106 0 0.403 0 0.833 0 
Exp 17 1 29 28 0 0.034 0 0.517 0 1 0 
Exp 18 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 19 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 20 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 21 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 22 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 23 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 24 1 29 292 0 0.003 0 0.093 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 292 1 0 0 0.090 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.0459 0.0393 0.3768 0.1991 0.9533 0.1973 

























Type I Error 
(False Positive) 
Type II Error 
(False Negative) 
Precision Std. Dev. Accuracy Std. Dev. Recall Std. Dev. 
Base 1 0 30 0 0  
Base 2 0 30 0 0 
Base 3 0 30 0 0 
Exp 1 1 29 1 0 0.500 0 0.968 0 1 0 
Exp 2 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 3 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 4 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 5 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 6 2 27 0 1 1 0 0.966 0 0.666 0 
Exp 7 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 8 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 9 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 10 3 26 0 0 1 0 0.966 0 0.750 0 
Exp 11 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 12 3 27 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 13 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 14 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 15 2 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 16 5 24 0 1 1 0 0.966 0 0.833 0 
Exp 17 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 18 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 19 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 20 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 21 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 22 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 23 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 24 1 29 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Exp 25 0 29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avg.  0.9400 0.2154 0.9546 0.1952 0.9299 0.2078 


















Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
The results obtained during the experiments suggest that it is indeed possible to detect the 
most common Windows encryption programs with a signature based approach. As can be seen in 
Table 4.9, a mean recall value of 0.95 was achieved with one of the combinations. This means that 
on average, 95% of the encryption programs, file systems or containers present in the test cases 
were detected. 
Contrary to prediction 1.1.1, the inclusion of File Header analysis improves the results 
minutely, if at all, and increases the runtime exponentially. The null-hypothesis (H0 = There exists 
one or more factor such that recallF >= recallheader) must therefore be accepted.  
Without the header analysis, all of the file system attributes can be analyzed without an 
additional increase in runtime rendering the exclusion of a particular attribute neutral in terms of 
execution time and negative in terms of recall. 
Due to the lack of a heuristic detection method that can be executed during a live analysis 
(i.e. on a running computer), prediction 1.1.2 could not be tested in its entirety and consequently, 
no conclusions can be drawn about the performance of heuristic predictors. Contrary to prediction 
1.1.2, the results suggest that the Keyword Analysis does not improve the results even if no 
signature for the particular version of the software is available. The null-hypothesis (H0 = There 
exists a factor F such that recallF >= recallkeyword for software products for which no accurate 
signature exists) must therefore be accepted.  
Additionally, the method has very high false positive rates that degrade precision and 
accuracy measures. While not necessarily negative in this context, false positives present a 
nuisance to the investigator that outweighs the little benefit this method provides.  
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As can be seen in Figures 15, 16 and 17, Registry Analysis is more reliable in terms of 
recall than any other single predictor and itself performs nearly as well as any combination of 
factors. Yet, the alternate hypothesis H1 stated in section 1.1.3 narrowly holds up as the results 
obtained with combinations C1-C3 improve the detection rate for a small set of the trials. Based on 
the experiments, the most useful combination C includes the following factors: Windows Registry, 
Operating System Attributes, File Attributes, File Extensions, and Master Boot Record.  
 

















Figure 16 - Comparison of the Average Accuracy 
 
Figure 17 - Comparison of the Average Recall 
  Beyond the predictions made in Section 1.1, one can conclude that recall, precision 
and accuracy are all inadequate predictors for the utility of a particular detection factor. The 
Operating System Attribute factor, for example, only detects one method of encryption and 





















widely used encryption software Microsoft BitLocker can be detected and its practical utility is 
therefore very high while its execution time is negligible.  
Due to the fact that accuracy is the ratio of the sum of true positives and true negatives to 
the sum of all four cells of the confusion matrix, its value is an even worse predictor. A factor 
yielding neither true nor false positives can, and often does, attain a high accuracy value but may 
be completely useless for the analysis.  
Likewise, precision can be regarded as of very limited use because it considers only the 
ratio of true positives to the sum of true and false positives while ignoring false negatives entirely. 
As stated in the opening chapter of this examination, even elevated numbers of false positives may 
be acceptable for the task at hand if they are accompanied by a minimum of false negatives as 




Chapter 6 - Future Work 
The framework that was developed as part of this work was targeted at the first responders 
of our law enforcement agencies. These responders often have limited understanding of technology 
and little access to specialists or specialized hardware and must determine whether a computer can 
or should be analyzed in a laboratory without the risk of loss of data or evidence. The tools 
provided to them should therefore minimize the amount of human intervention and the necessity 
for human analysis. An important area of future work is therefore the development or application 
of machine learning algorithms that can make reliable risk determinations based on the information 
gathered during the automated analysis. The ALERT framework in its current form can only draw 
on the type and number of indicia found to make a recommendation to the user. The first responder 
still has to review all of the results and decide if she arrives at the same determination as the 
analysis tool. 
A second important area of focus is the development of heuristic predictors for the 
presence of encryption. These predictors should be statistically verifiable. As shown in section 5, 
most of the factors identified for this analysis work dependably only as long as a signature for the 
exact version of the software exists. Anti-Virus software suffers from the same necessity to 
constantly maintain a signature database and companies have developed alternate means that 
observe the behavior of a process or program to identify possibly malign behavior. Similar means 
are needed for the identification and detection of encryption programs as well. 
Lastly, a good distribution mechanism for updates to the signature database must be 
developed. For malware and Anti-virus software, this problem does not exist as the computer that 
runs the software can usually be used to obtain updates and because the software is in constant use. 
Live encryption detection, however, is an analysis that is usually performed from an external 
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medium rather than being installed on the computer and it must be ensured that no or minimal 
changes are made to the computer to be analyzed so that the update can usually not be performed 
using the target machine. This should be accompanied by regular health-checks to determine 
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